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Kathleen E. Keest*
Kathleen
An adversarial
adversarial model of the
the law
law is in essence
essence a contest of
of
competing narratives.
narratives. Each
Each side
side musters
musters its evidence
evidence and arguments
arguments
competing
tries to undermine
undermine the opponent's
opponent's story. They lay
to tell a story, and tries
truth
matter before
before a judge or jury, and we,
we, as a society, trust that truth
the matter
the
often
at
least
and
justice
emerge
from
that
process,
often
enough
for
emerge
and
of the citizenry
citizenry in its integrity
integrity and capacity
capacity
system to sustain
sustain the
the faith of
to deliver on that promise.
enforce
The legislative and common
common law norms that courts are to enforce
emerge from competing narratives, as well. Public
Public policies
policies emerge
emerge
from all the large and small choices that our public and private
make-through action or inaction-from
institutions make-through
inaction-from among the
predictive and prescriptive stories proffered
proffered by proponents on all
predictive
sides.
History is no less a battle of competing narratives. This issue of the
Georgia State University Law Review, with its focus on consumer
financial services law and policy, comes at a time when once again
we are at a crossroads in our political economy. The financial crisis
that started in 2007 convinced most people that something went
of
profoundly wrong. But what? And what to do about it? History, of
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course, is always
always the ultimate
ultimate arbiter
arbiter of such questions, but it takes
takes a
while for its verdict
In the meantime,
meantime, we
verdict to come into clear
clear focus. In
write the stories that we
we hope will influence
influence history's
history's judgment.

***
consumer financial
Over the past thirty to forty-odd
forty-odd years,
years, consumer
financial services
services
policy
on which
which the competition
competition for the
policy has been one of the fields on
dominant
narrative in the larger society
society has been
dominant economic
economic policy narrative
played. What
What economic
economic principles
principles should
should provide
provide the framework for
interaction between
between financial businesses
our policies
policies regarding
regarding the interaction
businesses
and their customers? To what extent should government
government set the rules
of the game? Who (or what) should serve
serve as the referee
referee on the
playing
playing fields for the games between
between business
business and consumers?
consumers?
Where you stand on those questions is probably correlated
correlated with
where you stand
stand on the next questions. Does the market
automatically
automatically self-correct,
self-correct, or can it perversely
perversely create
create incentives
incentives for
conduct
that
imposes
serious
external
costs
on
society?
conduct
society? Do consumer
consumer
protection laws and regulations increase
increase costs to consumers,
consumers, reduce
"light-touch"
the availability
availability of credit, and stifle innovation, as the "light-touch"
and hands-off narrative goes? Or is public regulation
regulation necessary
necessary to
avoid market cheating, or exploitation
exploitation of the less sophisticated party
professionals in the business and any
in transactions between
between the professionals
any
given consumer?
consumer? Might it even be necessary to avoid a race to the
deceptive practices
bottom where irresponsible, unfair and deceptive
practices are
of
detriment of
rewarded (at least in the near term) to the ultimate detriment
consumers and fair competition, and even the economy as a whole, as
another story goes?
narrative was
At the beginning
beginning of this period, 1968, the prevailing narrative
a
competitive
market,
but
one
that
operated
within
the bounds
that of
of substantive legal ground rules. The ground rules included, for
example, usury ceilings and other outside limits on terms and
practices. This approach to consumer financial services had been the
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norm throughout most of the Twentieth century.
century.'I Regulation
nonn
Regulation was
consumer protection
protection historically
historically was
decided at the state level, as consumer
between
considered a matter of state concern. During the decade between
1968 and 1978, it began to be a federal concern,
concern, as well. Congress
Congress
added most of the chapters in the federal consumer
protection
act
consumer
act
2
2
during that decade.
experienced serious inflation in the late-1970s
late-1970s to
But the country experienced
early-1980s, and the Federal
early-1980s,
Federal Reserve Board's monetary
monetary policy to
combat
it
sent
interest
rates
to
historic
highs.
Those
interest rates
combat
butted up against mortgage rate ceilings, and the housing and
mortgage industry sought legislative relief.
relief. Most states responded
responded by
lifting mortgage rate caps entirely, or by enacting floating rate
ceilings. (Floating ceilings put a cap at a specified margin above a
specified
specified market-based
market-based index, to assure that the cap will not be below
rates.) Congress followed, deregulating
market
market rates.)
deregulating mortgage lending by
by
preempting
preempting state laws limiting interest rates, points, and non-standard
non-standard
terms
such
as
adjustable
rates,
balloon
payments,
and
negative
tenns
payments,
3
3
amortization.

1.
I. For an excellent overview of the early Twentieth century
century reform efforts on small loan lending,
see generally
generally Combating
Combating the Shark.
Shark, Symposium,
Symposium, 8 LAW &
& CONTEMP.
CONTEMP. PROB. 1-205 (Winter
(Winter 1941).
1941). (It is
is
especially interesting
interesting in light of the current
current debate over payday
payday lending. This
This business model is
strikingly similar to one
one used at the turn of the Twentieth century that was the object of that early reform
movement.) A good general history of the development of consumer financial services
to
movement.)
services regulation up to
the late 1960s is BARBARA
BARBARA CURRAN,
CURRAN, TRENDS IN
IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1966).
2. Most of the titles that compose the federal Consumer Credit
Credit Protection chapter
chapter in the U.S. Code
1978. Subch. I,, Truth
1601 et seq.
seq.
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601
were enacted
enacted between 1968 and 1978.
(1968), including the Fair Credit Billing
(1974) and Consumer Lease
15
(1968).
Billing Act, 15
15 U.S.C. § 1666
1666 (1974)
Lease Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1667 (1976);
H1,Restrictions on Garnishment,
(1968); Subch. III, Fair
U.S.c.
(1976); Subch.
Subch. II,
Garnishment, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1968);
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
(1970); Subch. IV, Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. 15 U.S.C. §
U.S.C. § 1681 (1970);
Credit Opportunity
(1974); Subchapter
Subchapter V, Fair Debt Collection Practices
1691 (1974);
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 (1977);
(1977); Subchapter
VI, Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1978).
(1978). The federal financial regulators were given
authority to define unfair
unfair and deceptive acts and practices
practices for financial institutions by regulation
regulation in
1975. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
45(a)(2) (2006).
. 1975.15
3. The Depository
Monetary Control Act (DIDA) preempted state
Depository Institutions Deregulation
Deregulation and Monetary
interest
(1980).
interest rate and points caps
caps on first lien mortgages in 1980. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1735f-7a (I
980). The
Altemative
preempted state laws limiting non-traditional
Alternative Mortgage
Mortgage Transactions
Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) preempted
non-traditional
mortgage terms in
1982. 12 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq (1982).
(1982). There were no substantive federal substitutes
in 1982.
for the preempted state law, thus effectively deregulating
mortgage market. See generally
deregulating the mortgage
generally
ELIZABETH
RENUART, KATHLEEN E. KEEST, ET AL."
AL.,, THE COST
PREEMPTION,
ELIZABETH RENUART,
COST OF CREDIT:
CREDIT: REGULATION,
REGULATION, PREEMPTION,
AND INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY ABUSES,
ABUSES, §§ 3.10-3.11 (4th ed. 2009). For a history of this period,
period, including the state law
responses to the record-high
record-high interest
"HEL"
interest rates, see Cathy Lesser
Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
Subprime "HEL"

Published by Reading Room, 2010

3
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1089 2009-2010

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 8

1090
1090

GEORGIA STATE
STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW
GEORGIA

(Vol. 26:4
26:4
[Vol.

Deregulation
Deregulation as to
to substantive
substantive terms,
terms, then, began
began as aa practical
practical
solution to temporary
temporary market
market conditions.
conditions. But
But it stayed in the public
public
policy
dominant narrative
narrative over
over the following
following
policy debate as the more dominant
thirty years
once again, the larger
larger
years as a matter of philosophy. Then, once
economy experienced
economy
experienced a seismic
seismic shock. In
In 2007-2008,
2007-2008, our financial
system
system came
came close to collapse,
collapse, triggering
triggering an international
international economic
economic
crisis and the Great Recession.
In
In aa hundred
hundred years,
years, history may judge
judge this most recent
recent financial
market meltdown
beginning of the end of
of an
an
meltdown as the end of an era, the beginning
era, or just as a bump
bump in the road. Congress
Congress is currently
currently considering
considering
4
what, if anything, to do to prevent
recurrence, as is the rest of the
prevent a recurrence,4
world. We don't have a winner yet in the battle
battle of competing
competing
narratives
implications of the crisis, but the
narratives over the causes
causes and implications
debate
debate is in process, and it is making
making for a very noisy and smoky
battlefield
Washington-so noisy and smoky that it's still hard to
battlefield in Washington-so
see clearly
clearly now. "It
"It was 'short-termism'
'short-termism' and greed by the financial
sector, forsaking sound
business
sound business practices
practices in pursuit of short term
profits and growth."
"It was the government's
government's fault: too much
much
growth." "It
mis-directed policies."
policies." "It
"It was government doing
intervention and mis-directed
too little to curb reckless, irresponsible, and abusive behavior in the
market."
"It was the borrowers'
borrowers' fault: they bought more house than
market." "It
afford." "It was everybody's
everybody's failure to come to grips with
they could afford."
the increasing financial insecurity
insecurity of American
American households."
households." "It
"It was
the Greenspan
Greenspan Fed's monetary
monetary policy of keeping interest rates too
low too long."
long." "It was a global glut of money, looking for higher
returns and finding it in mortgage-backed
mortgage-backed securities based on houses
cul-de-sacs in the sunnier parts of America."
America." "It was all of the
on cul-de-sacs
above and more."
While Congress is debating specific
specific reform proposals, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), established in 2009 to
"examine the
the causes,
causes, domestic
domestic and
and global,
global, of the current financial
"examine
Was Paved
Paved with Good Congressional
CongressionalIntentions:
Intentions: Usury
Usury Deregulation
Deregulationand
and the
the Subprime
Was
Subprime Home Equity
Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L.
L. REv.
REV. 473 (2000).
Market.
The House of Representatives
Representatives passed
passed a financial
reform package in
in December 2009.
2009. The Wall
financial reform
4. The
Consumer Protection
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, III
111th
Cong. (2009). The Senate
th Congo
Street Report and Consumer
Committee is in negotiations as this is being
being written.
Banking Committee
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5 just
economic crisis in
in the United
United States,"
States,"S
just held
held its first hearing
hearing
and economic
6
6
at the time of
of this writing. The
The FCIC
FCIC is charged
charged with examining
examining
twenty~two "areas
"areas of inquiry related
related to the financial
financial crisis,"
crisis,"
some twenty-two
including:
"
• fraud and abuse
abuse in the financial sector, including
including fraud
and abuse
mortgage sector;
abuse towards
towards consumers
consumers in the mortgage
"
• Federal
Federal and State financial regulators, including
including the
extent
they enforced,
enforced, or
or failed to enforce
enforce
extent to which they
statutory, regulatory,
regulatory, or
or supervisory
supervisory requirements;
requirements;
"
international capital
capital
• the global imbalance
imbalance of savings, international
governments;
flows, and fiscal imbalances
imbalances of various
various governments;
terms of credit;
availability
and
the
monetary
policy
and
"
• monetary
availability
•* accounting practices,
practices, including, mark-to-market
mark-to-market and
and
sheet
fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance
off-balance sheet
vehicles;
"
financial products
products and investments;
investments;
• tax treatment
treatment of financial
requirements and regulations
•" capital requirements
regulations on leverage and
and
regulated
liquidity, including
including the capital
capital structures
structures of regulated
non-regulated financial entities;
and non-regulated
"
credit
rating agencies
•
agencies in the financial
fmancial system, including,
reliance
reliance on credit
credit ratings by financial institutions and
Federal
Federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in
credit ratings in the
financial regulation, and the use of credit
securitization markets;
securitization
•* lending practices
practices and securitization, including
including the
originate-to-distribute model for extending
originate-to-distribute
extending credit and
and
transferring risk;
*
• affiliations between insured depository institutions and
securities, insurance,
insurance, and other types of nonbanking
companies;

1617 (2009).
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
5(a), Pub. L. No. 111-21,
Recovery Act of 2009 § Sea),
5. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
6. The FCIC held its first public hearing on January
January 13,2010.
13, 2010. http://www.fcic.govlhearingslOI-13http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/01-132010.php. The FCIC website explains
"[i]n the wake of the most significant financial crisis since the
explains that "[iun
Enforcement and Recovery
law on May 20, 2009, the Fraud Enforcement
President signed into law
Great Depression, the President
Commission." http://www.fcic.gov/about.
Financial Crisis
Crisis Inquiry
Inquiry Commission."
Act of 2009, creating
creating the Financial
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the concept
concept that certain
certain institutions
institutions are
are 'too-big-to-fail'
'too-big-to-fail'
and
and its impact
impact on
on market
market expectations;
expectations;
*
corporate
• corporate governance,
governance, including
including the impact of company
company
conversions
corporations;
conversions from partnerships
partnerships to corporations;
"
compensation structures;
• compensation
structures;
"
• changes in compensation
compensation for employees
employees of financial
compared to compensation
compensation for others
companies, as compared
with similar skill sets in the labor market;
"• the legal
legal and regulatory
regulatory structure
structure of the United
United States
States
housing market;
"
derivatives and unregulated
• derivatives
unregulated financial products and
and
swaps;
default
practices, including
including credit
credit default
*
short-selling;
•
•" financial institution
institution reliance on numerical
numerical models,
including risk models
models and credit
credit ratings;
"
• the legal and regulatory
regulatory structure
structure governing financial
which the structure
institutions, including
including the extent to which
opportunity for financial
creates the opportunity
financial institutions to
engage in regulatory
regulatory arbitrage;
investor
•" the legal and regulatory structure
structure governing investor
and mortgagor
protection;
mortgagor
*• financial institutions and government-sponsored
government-sponsored
enterprises; and
enterprises;
"
• the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial
institutions.77
of
It is possible that there will be few acquittals
acquittals from this list of
said
possible culprits, and more may be added to the list before all is said
and done. Probably most of them were contributors in varying
degrees, and undoubtedly they interacted in a way that amplified
consequences far beyond the damage each of them would
negative consequences
have wrought standing alone.
But how did we manage to create so many storm cells at roughly
the same time--cells
time--cells that would merge into this Perfect Storm? The
Sheila
Insurance Corporation, Sheila
current Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance
"
•

5(c)(I)(A)-(V).
and Recovery
Recovery Act of
of 2009 § 5(c)(\)(A}-(V).
7. Fraud Enforcement and
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Bair (and one of the few early warning
warning voices in official Washington)
Washington)
testified at the first FCIC hearing that

culmination of a decades-long process
[t]his crisis represents the culmination
by which our national policies have distorted economic activity
away from savings and toward consumption, away from
investment
investment in our industrial base and public infrastructure and
toward housing, away from the real sectors of our economy and
toward the financial sector. No single policy is responsible for
these distortions, and no one reform can restore balance to our
economy. 88
That is a fair assessment, but it still leaves questions of which
which
and
the
norm,
policies?
policies? How and why did those distortions become
become
why did they have such lasting power?
of
It may help to view these questions against the larger canvas
canvas of
trends in the culture at the same time-in our economic
economic academy, our
corporate culture, the law, and in politics over roughly the same time
converged into a shift in the zeitgeist that led
span. All of these trends converged
narrative-the transformation
to a reversal of the dominant narrative-the
transformation of the
Market"--a cultural, political, and even legal force
market into "The Market"-a
of its own.

***
As we listen to broadcast news and commentary, we almost can
letters--"The Market" as a proper
hear the capital
proper noun, and
capital letters-"The
Market" was pleased by this event
event .....
. . ,
anthropomorphized, "The Market"
anthropomorphized.
"The Market"
Market" was
"The
Market" was displeased by that speech
speech,...., .. "The
"The Market"
jittery after something did or did not happen. Indeed, some
commentators
theological overtones
commentators have been struck
struck by the almost theological

'n
Crisis Before the Fin.
Causes and
and Current
Current State of the Financial
8. The Causes
Financial Crisis
Fin. Crisis
Crisis Inquiry
Inquiry Comm 'n
(Jan.
(Jan. 14, 2010) (Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation),
available
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0114-Bair.pdf.
available at http://www.fcic.govlhearings/pdfsl20IO-0114-Bair.pdf.
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to our cultural embrace of "The Market"-"omnipotent,
Market"-"omnipotent, . . .
9
omnipresent."
and
omniscient...
... and omnipresent.,,9
omniscient
academy
That transformation
transformation may have begun in the halls of the academy
economists and our MBAs are trained. In
economics
In economics
where our economists
"efficient markets"
laissez-faire school
school became
became
departments, the "efficient
markets" or laissez-faire
the dominant orthodoxy over the past four decades. Under
Under this school
economic thought, markets are self-correcting, hence best left
left
of economic
alone. Agents in the market (that would be the people
involved)
are
people
1O
10
became mathematical
rational actors. The standard methodology became
modeling, rather
rather than real world study of human and institutional
behavior. The assumptions plugged into those mathematical
mathematical models,
models,
in turn, were predicated
upon
those
efficient
market
axioms.
predicated
efficient
corollary in our business schools, as the premise
There was a corollary
premise that
the sole responsibility
corporation is to maximize profits for its
responsibility of a corporation
shareholders
day."II "The Market"
Market" migrated into the
shareholders came to carry the day.
law, as well, with the rise of the Law and Economics school, which
which
includes
includes influential
influential appellate judges like Judge
Judge Richard Posner
among
among its proponents.
represented not
Arguably the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 represented
just the political embrace
"The Market"
embrace of faith in the "The
Market" by a winning
candidate,
candidate, but its embrace as a fundamental
fundamental value of the culture. This
perceived as a transformational
transformational president,
is part of the reason he is perceived
9. Harvey Cox, Notes &
& Comments, The Market
Market as God: Living in
in the New Dispensation,
Dispensation,
ATLANTIC
1999, at
19. E.g.
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1999,
at 19.
E.g. THOMAS FRANK,
FRANK, ONE MARKET
MARKET UNDER GOD:
GoD: EXTREME
EXTREME
CAPITALISM,
DEMOCRACY (Doubleday 2000).
CAPITALISM, MARKET POPULISM,
POPULISM, AND THE
THE END
END OF ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

10. My own perspective
perspective is that this fundamental
fundamental axiom assumes
assumes away
away reality,
reality, since human history is
full of human
human irrationality.
irrationality. And however rigorous the steps that follow may be, that assuming away
reality
reality part is bound to come back and bite. One of my favorite examples of the fallacy in play: After II
talked
talked about widespread
widespread flawed underwriting
underwriting and appraisals in the non-prime
non-prime mortgage market
market at a
meeting
panelist who was an official
official at a nonprime lender could not contain
meeting in early 2005, a fellow panelist
himself:
business." Obviously, I must
himself: "It doesn't happen. This is a business, and that would
would be stupid business."
have
itself. (Today, however, widespread
have been mistaken that The Market might such stupidity
stupidity to infect itself.
widespread
reckless
See, e.g.
e.g.
mortgage meltdown.
meltdown. See,
reckless underwriting
underwriting is almost universally
universally conceded to be a cause
cause of the mortgage
Structured Finance in Focus, A Short Guide to Subprime, The Sub
Subprime
Context,
Structured
prime Decline-Putting
Decline-Putting it in Context,
Moody's Investors Service,
("The subprime crisis
Service, March
March 2008 ('The
crisis is largely a product of increasingly
increasingly
aggressive mortgage loan underwriting
competition to maintain
origination volume
aggressive
underwriting standards adopted
adopted as competition
maintain origination
intensified amid a cooling national housing market.") (available at http://www.sec.gov/commentsls7-I3http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1308/s71308-58.pdf).
08/s71308-58.pdt).
1I. Milton Friedman,
Social Responsibility
Increase its Profits,
Profits, NEW YORK
YORK
II.
Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase
13, 1970), available
at http://www.colorado.edulstudentgroups!
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/
TIMES MAGAZINE
MAGAZINE at 17 (September 13,
available at
libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html (last visited March 6,2010).
6, 2010).
libertarianslissueslfriedman-soc-resp-business.html
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irrespective
irrespective of one's views on whether
whether it was for better or worse. Its
political message-trust the private sector instead
instead of government,
rather than valuing both, and trying to design business and political
processes aimed at assuring
processes
assuring that both sectors warrant the public trust.
Over the past thirty years it seems
seems as if economics was politicized,
while politics and public policy were "Marketized."
"Marketized."
But, of course, there have been competing
competing narratives on all these
fronts throughout this era. And today, in light of the crisis, they are
being heard more. Behavioral
Behavioral economists are making rapid progress
at getting their perspective
academia and the
perspective into the mainstream
mainstream of academia
12
12
policy world. The general press has begun to bring them into the
national
national conversation, as well. 1133 (At the risk of oversimplifying,
oversimplifying,
behavioral economists believe
people-on both sides of a
behavioral
believe that people-on
transaction-aren't
transaction-aren't always rational. Radical, I know, but there it is.)
In the business
business world, we are beginning
beginning to hear more that corporate
corporate
responsibility
shareholders and stakeholders, and not
responsibility is to both shareholders
measured
measured simply by next quarter's
quarter's profit and loss statements.
Recently
attributed the financial meltdown to a
Recently the CEO of PepsiCo attributed
"maniacal
shareholders."' 4 Her suggested cure for
"maniacal focus on the shareholders.,,14
business: "our
"our new P &
& LL actually says revenue, less costs of good
society-and that's your real profit.,,15
profit."' 5 Even some
sold, less costs to society-and

12.
& Eldon Shafir, Behaviorally Informed
12. See,
See. e.g. Michael S. Barr, Sendhill Mullainathan, &
Financial
Services Regulation,
http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafbehavioral_v5.pdf. Mr.
Financial Services
Regulation, Oct. 2008, http://www.newamerica.netifileslnaCbehavioral_v5.pdf.Mr.
Barr was
was subsequently appointed to
to be Assistant
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Treasury for Financial
Financial Institutions.
Institutions. See
also RICHARD
RICHARD H. THALER
DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH,
THALER & CASS
CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
NUDGE: IMPROVING
IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS
HAPPINESS (Yale Univ.
WEALTH, AND
Univ. Press 2008). Mr.
Mr. Sunstein was appointed by President
President Obama to
the
the White House
House Office of
of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Affairs.
Controversial,
Controversial, but almost
almost universal,
universal, credit
credit card
card practices that
that Congress recently
recently took
took aim atat with
with
the
Illthe Credit
Credit Card Accountability,
Accountability, Responsibility
Responsibility and
and Disclosure
Disclosure (CARD) Act of
of 2009, Pub.
Pub. L. No.
No. 11124,
24, 123
123 Stat. 1734, cannot
cannot be explained by efficient market theory
theory (except as
as aa massive "market
failure"),
failure"), but
but are
are well explained under other economic
economic analytical frames. See Joshua M. Frank,
Frank, What
Does the Credit
Credit Card
Market Have
Have In Common with a Peacock?,
Peacock?, LYDIAN
LYDIAN PAYMENTS
PAYMENTS J.,
Card Market
J., Nov. 2009,
2009, atat
availableat
at http://pymnts.com/assets/Shared/LPJ-Voll-Nol
.pdf..
24-40, available
http://pymnts.com/assetslSharedILPJ-Voll-Nol.pdf
13.
of PREDICTABLY
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL:
IRRATIONAL: THE
THE HIDDEN
HIDDEN FORCES
OUR
13. E.g.
E.g. Dan
Dan Ariely, author of
FORCES THAT
THAT SHAPE
SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (HarperCollins 2008) and aa behavioral
DECISIONS
behavioral economist isis frequently seen and heard in the
the popular
popular
business press.
14. PepsiCo
Profit and
and Loss, NPR
PepsiCo CEO:
CEO: Refine Profit
NPR Marketplace,
Marketplace, Jan. 29, 2010,
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/01/29/pm-davos-pepsi-ceo-q/.
http://marketplace.publicradio.orgldisplay/web/2010/01129/pm-davos-pep
si-ceo-q/.
15.
KELLY, THE
THE DNINE
DIVINE RIGHT
DETHRONING THE
THE
15. Id.
Id. See generally,
generally, MARJORIE
MAIuORIE KELLY,
RIGHT OF
OF CAPITAL:
CAPITAL: DETHRONING
CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY
2001).
CORPORATE
ARISTOCRACY (Berrett Koehler 2001).
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of those within the industry are expressing second thoughts,16
thoughts, 16 as has
the most famous "light-touch"
"light-touch" federal regulator. Former Federal
Reserve
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
Greenspan admitted to a House panel
panel
regulators in the crisis that he was
looking at the role of federal regulators
shocked to find "a flaw in the model that defines how the world
works"l 7 -in other words, the world view behind his regulatory
works"17-in
laissez-faire
laissez-faire philosophy. On the Law and Economics front, Judge
proponents
has revisited some of
of
Richard Posner, one of its foremost proponents
18
18
well.
as
his core economic assumptions,
assumptions, as well.
We've seen that deceptive
deceptive or unfair practices
practices can be good for
competitive
market share and share value in the short term, so the competitive
pressures can mean a race to the bottom, if there is no regulatory
19 Citibank, for example,
floor. 19
example, tried to voluntarily
voluntarily abandon
abandon the
controversial
universal
default
practice
in
its
credit
card
business,
but
controversial
practice
reversed
reversed itself when revenues
revenues declined, and no one else followed.22o°
So, in the wake of the crisis, the concept
concept of regulation
regulation as a safety net

16.
16. John Robbins,
Robbins, former chair of the Mortgage Bankers
Bankers Association, said: "We
"We forgot about our
our
customers,
important." Kate
Kate Berry,
customers, and making money and our commission checks were more important."
Wachovia Alum has Tips
Tips for an
an Industry Rebound,
Rebound, AM.
Am. BANKER,
15, 2008, available
available at
at
Wachovia
BANKER, Sept. 15,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/73_183/-361981-I
.html.
http://www.americanbanker.comlissueslI73_183/-361981-1.html.
17.
17. His testimony on this and other aspects of his consumer
consumer protection philosophy while Chair of the
Federal
Consumer Protections
Patricia McCoy, Consumer
Protections in
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) is quoted
quoted in Testimony
Testimony of Prof. Patricia
Financial
Services: Past
Past Problems,
Future Solutions
S. Comm. on Banking.
Banking, Housing
Financial Services:
Problems. Future
Solutions Before the S.
Housing and
Urban Affairs, III
I 11th
Cong. 17-18
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?
Urban
th Congo
17-18 (2009), available
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?
=
FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_)-1
be680d-04db-42cc-89bf-7fe4ffe4d9cd& Witness_ ID=
FuseAction=Hearings.
Testimony&Hearin&.,.ID= 11lbe680d-04db-42cc-89bf-7fe4ffe4d9cd&WitnessID
b6ba6O4a-d441-43e3-9951-lfbab4blle57. See also
Did Economists
Economists Get It So
b6ba604a-d441-43e3-9951-lfbab4blle57.
also Paul Krugman,
Krugman, How Did
Wrong? NEW YORK TiMES
TIMES MAGAZINE,
MAGAZINE, Sept. 6,2009, at 36.
Wrong?
18. RICHARD A. POSNER,
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
Univ. Press 2009) ("We are learning from it that we need a more active
DEPRESSION xii (Harvard Vniv.
active and
intelligent government
capitalist economy from running off the rails. The
intelligent
government to keep our model of a capitalist
movement to deregulate
resilience--the selfselfderegulate the financial industry went too far by exaggerating
exaggerating the resilience--the
movement
healing powers-of
powers-of laissez-faire
laissez-faire capitalism.").
COMPETITION 42
19. Compare
Compare the 1935
1935 observation of Frank Hyneman Knight in THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION
(Transaction Publishers 1997)
1997) ('[T]here
("[T]here is truth in the allegation that unregulated competition places a
premium on
on deceit
FRB Chairman
Chairman Bemanke
Bernanke of the role they
premium
deceit and corruption.") with the admission of FRB
contributed
contributed to the recent
recent crisis. See Statement
Statement of Chairman Ben Bemanke,
Bernanke, FRB Press
Press Release, July 14,
14,
2008, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newseventslpresslbcreglbemankeregz20080714.htm.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankeregz20080714.htm. (unfair and
and
deceptive practices by lenders
borrower.")
lenders resulted in loans that were "inappropriate
"inappropriate for or misled the borrower.")
20. See, e.g.
e.g. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion:
Street's Race to the Bottom, WALL ST. 1.,
J., Feb. 8,
Opinion: Wall Street's
2010, at A19. Universal default allowed credit card issuers to raise interest
interest rates on their card
card holders
existing balances to penalty rates that were often double what the rate was when the debt was incurredincurredwithout the consumer
consumer ever having breached
breached his contract with the issuer. The extra interest was very
very
profitable.
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is
is coming
coming back. Whether
Whether the
the current
current debates
debates mean
mean another paradigm
paradigm
magnitude of the
the one at the front edge
edge of
of this era
era is yet
yet to
shift of the magnitude
be seen. But it is in play.

***
As it happens, the
the professional
professional careers
careers of most of the authors
same period,
period,
represented in this series also span most or all of this same
represented
consumer financial
financial services
services law
law has been their area of
of
and consumer
either.
observers,
academic
specialization.
They
have
not
been
academic
observers,
mere
specialization.
contributed to the development of the field. They, too,
Most have contributed
stories that help illustrate consumer financial services law as
have stories
over
part of the battleground over the economic soul of the country over
the past generation. Professor
Professor Budnitz chronicles
chronicles the growth of what
careers--consumer financial
was a rarity in the field we began our careers--consumer
services lawyers who represented
represented actual
actual consumers,
consumers, and brought their
clients'
record and into these policy debates.
clients' stories into the record
Professors Alces
Alces and Greenfield's
Greenfield's article
article revives some basic
Professors
principles of contract law that have often seemed hard to get traction
principles
in a Law and Economics environment. Professors Miller and Harrell
policy
weigh in directly with their views as to some of the current policy
many
debates arising out the crisis, adding their narratives
narratives
to
the
21
21
come.
to
yet
more
many more yet to come.
already out there, and many
But the last chapter
chapter on this debate at the intersection of politics,
economics has yet to be written. So tune in again
policy, law, and economics
later-to see what the coming of age story of consumer financial
services looks like from perspective
perspective of history.

21. In the interest
21.
interest of full disclosure, my colleagues and I at the CRL are among those who have
Julia
See, e.g., Testimony of Julia
offered explanations
explanations as to what did, and did not, contribute to the crisis. See,
offered
available at
Comm'n (Jan.
Gordon
13, 2010), available
Crisis Inquiry
Inquiry Comm'n
Fin. Crisis
Gordon Before the Fin.
Markets: The
Credit Markets:
Turmoil in the U.S. Credit
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfS/20IO-01l3-Gordon.pdf;
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0l13-Gordon.pdf; Turmoil
Urban Affairs
Affairs
Housing and Urban
Banking, Housing
Genesis
Current Economic Crisis
Comm. on Banking,
CrisisBefore the S. Comm.
Genesis of the Current
(2008) (Statement
(Statement of Eric Stein, Senior Vice President, CRL); Kathleen E. Keest, The Subprime
for Policy
Housing Crisis Symposium:
A Framework
Policy Responses, Dec. 9, 2008,
Framework for
Symposium: The Way Ahead: A
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislationfhe-Way-Ahead-A-Frameworkhttp://www.responsiblelending.orglmortgage-Iendinglpolicy-Iegislationffhe-Way-Ahead-A-Framework17-18.
17, at 17-18.
supranote 17,
ofProf.
Prof. Patricia McCoy, supra
for-Policy-Responses.htm1;
for-Policy-Responses.html; Testimony of
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